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Archive for October, 2007

I.                   Introduction

       The most frequently referred social class division in Indonesia is perhaps the one argued by Clifford Geertz (1960) who distinguished it into three classes: santri, orthodox Muslims especially among merchants and wealthier peasants as opposed to abangan, Javanese ordinary people who syncretize Islam and Hindu-Buddhist traditions and is considered to be a much less devout Muslim than santri, and the last one, priyayi, Javanese aristocrats. However, some scholars do not fully agree with the way these three classes are grouped, for the last class, priyayi, is problematic in such a way that it should not be grouped within the other two classes. Santri is a class that horizontally opposes abangan in terms of religious devoutness, while priyayi is an aristocrat class as opposed to ordinary people that could belong to either santri or abangan (Hefner 1987; Noer 1973, p. 19). Given that priyayi is arguably out of the two opposing classes, I will examine santri and abangan classes in relation to voting patterns in Indonesia by analyzing the first democratic election held in 1955. The major objective of this article is to delineate the general tendency of voting patterns in Indonesia’s 1955 election in which santri vis-à-vis abangan at the time had been the most prevalent cleavage in the country. Despite the fact that each of santri and abangan itself might have different political parties’ affiliation, this article will, however, neither be discussing on the differences between each of them nor picking example of other Indonesia’s elections after 1955.

 

II.                Santri versus Abangan

       Geertz (1960) argued that there are two general differences between santri and abangan (p. 126-130). The first difference is determined from the viewpoint of a set of beliefs in which santri adheres Islamic doctrines, while abangan is sympathetic to rituals deriving from the syncretism of Hindu-Buddhist traditions and Javanese cultures as well as Islam. One example of this ritual is a tradition of giving slametan (ceremonial meals to both people and the spirits), hoping that their will be secure from misfortune. In contrast, santri does not tolerate this misleading tradition not only because it is the one that is deeply influenced by old Indonesian Hindu-Buddhist traditions but also it is strictly forbidden in Islam. This is not to say that santri does not have a ritual, indeed it has a set of rituals that is, however, not the same as abangan’s rituals, for it emanates from Islamic doctrines such as five times compulsory worship in a day and certain prayers that are said in certain events. 

       The second difference can be observed through their social organization. For the abangan the basic social unit to which nearly all ritual refers is the household—a man, his wife, and children. When there is a slametan held by individual abangan, it is organized by his or her households and those who come to attend the ceremony and receive the ceremonial meals are the heads of other households. For the santri, the sense of community—of ummat [the community of Muslims in a broad sense]—is seen as a set of concentric social circles and wider communities (ibid., p. 128). Santri believes that being a Muslim is inescapably being a member of broader communities which are naturally trans-national.

 

III.             1955 Election and the ‘Big Four’ Political Parties

       In 1955 Indonesia held its first democratic election since its independence on August 17, 1945, indeed it is strikingly interesting as an experiment in democracy (cf. Baswedan 2004; Eklöf 2003; Feith 1957; Karim 1983). This election was held in September and October 1955 for the parliament and constituent assembly respectively. In this section I will examine the ‘big four’ political parties that gained majority of votes so as to delineate voting patterns under the categorization of santri-abangan cleavage. In 1955 there were four major parties that dominated the votes: PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), Nadhatul Ulama (Ulama Association) and PKI (Communist Party).

       PNI was founded in Bandung, the capital city of West Java, by Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, on July 4, 1927 as a party that had a principle aimed at overthrowing capitalism and colonialism in Indonesia (Karim 1983, p. 34), but nevertheless as Eklöf (2003) commented that the central objective of PNI was to achieve the independence of Indonesia (p. 27) and its ideology was certainly nationalism with which Sukarno yearned to unite Indonesian various groups of people (Liddle 1970, ch. 3). Noer (1973) argued that since the very beginning of its founding, PNI challenged the position of Sarekat Islam, the first biggest Islamic mass organization founded in 1911 by Samanhudi that although it was initially aimed at supporting Indonesian Muslim traders to better compete with Chinese minorities, it gradually developed into a more politically oriented organization when H.O.S. Cokroaminoto took over the leadership in 1912, or any Muslim leadership in the overall independence movement (p. 138).

       The second biggest political party was Masyumi founded on November 7, 1945 in Yogyakarta, Central Java, aimed to establish an Islamic Indonesian state and to promote the implementation of Islamic law as well as to treat Islam as a basic principle of the state. This party was initially expected to be the only Indonesian Muslims party until Nadhatul Ulama, one of the biggest Islamic mass organizations that remains existing today, ultimately renounced its membership in Masyumi in April 1952 and decided to participate in 1955 election as a political party. Since its founding until December 1950, Masyumi had succeeded in forming its branches in almost all districts and villages in Java Island and some numbers of them in outside Java. Indeed, at the time it was reported to have had approximately 10 millions members in total (Karim 1983, p. 70-71).

       Nadhatul Ulama which literary means the Resurrection of Ulama (Muslim priest) was naturally not a political party as it was founded by Hasyim Asy’ari in 1926 to act as a counter organization to the Caliphate Committee which was gradually being dominated by the reformist and to appeal to Ibn Saud, the new ruler of Arabia, that traditional religious practices should be continued (Noer 1973, p. 222). It has also been considered to be a traditionalist Muslim organization that has a distinct sort of traditional school as opposed to modern school called pesantren. Since it is established in Surabaya, the capital city of East Java, its basic support is mainly drawn from Java Island, particularly East Java, though it has also numerous branches outside Java. It used to belong to Masyumi before it pulled out in 1952 and participated in 1955 and 1971 elections probably due to growing tensions between Nadhatul Ulama’s clergies and Masyumi intellectuals who were non-Nadhatul Ulama being considered having more reformist thoughts. Another reason is most likely the one argued by Machali (2004) that Nadhatul Ulama’s decision to renounce its affiliation in Masyumi is because its clergymen resented the fact that they were being localized in merely religious affairs.

       The least successful political party in the ‘big four’ is PKI or Communist Party which was built on May 23, 1920 in Semarang, the capital city of Central Java and led by Semaun and Darsono as a chairman and vice chairman respectively (Karim 1983, p. 26). In an attempt to appeal to grassroots, PKI infiltrated Sarekat Islam and succeeded in splitting it up into two wings; white Sarekat Islam that was able to maintain its Islamic principles and red Sarekat Islam that was heavily influenced and mobilized by PKI. In the absence of significant labor class with which communists have to work hand in hand at the time, PKI was doing quiet well to appeal to Indonesian peasants.

 

IV.             Voting Patterns of the ‘Big Four’ in 1955 Election

       Using santri-abangan cleavage to analyze the votes gained by the ‘big four’, many scholars firmly believe that the majority of santri’s votes go to both Masyumi and Nadhatul Ulama, whereas the abangan’s votes largely go to both PNI and PKI (Feith 1957; Kahn 1978; Liddle 1970). However, in terms of political allegiance Kahn (ibid.) associated priyayi, Javanese aristocrats, with the nationalist parties such as PNI, santri with the Muslim parties such as Masyumi and Nadhatul Ulama and abangan with the communist parties such as PKI. In contrast to Kahn, Feith (ibid.) argued that both PNI and PKI competed for abangan support as it is interpreted as a class covering town as well as village dwellers, but the only nominally Muslims or aristocratic origin are known as priyayi and not considered abangan (p. 32). The following is the ‘big four’ total votes in number and percent in 1955 election: PNI: 8,434,653 (22.32%); Masyumi: 7,903,886 (20.92%), NU: 6,955,141 (18.41%); PKI: 6,176,914 (16.36%).

       According to the election result shown in the above table and graphic, we can divide the ‘big four’ parties into two major opposing poles; santri and abangan parties. Thus Masyumi and Nadhatul Ulama constitute santri parties, while PNI and PKI constitute abangan parties.

       The total percent of votes gained by santri parties (Masyumi and NU) is 39.33%, while abangan parties (PNI and PKI) is 38.68%. It is obvious that there is only a slight different amount of votes percentage between ‘big four’ santri and abangan parties, supporting the argument that the divergence of social classes along the santri and abangan lines in relation to voting patterns in 1955 election is significant. This distinct social cleavage has its roots in Indonesian history. Before Islam penetrated into the society brought by some Indian and Arab traders through peaceful means such as trading, marriage, and so forth Indonesia was ruled by subsequent Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms such as Sriwijaya and Majapahit since approximately 7th and 13th century respectively (Ricklefs 1981, p. 1-13). Since Islam was introduced by means of non-coercion approaches, its teachings somehow adjusted to people’s cultures at the time without having to go astray from its basic principles. As a result, though these Muslim immigrants had been successful in converting a large number of Indonesian people, old Hindu-Buddhist traditions did not completely disappear, leading to the formation of group which was defined by Geertz as abangan. Meanwhile, since 18th century there was a large number of Indonesian Muslims going to some Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi, Yemen and Turkey to pursue study further on Islamic subjects (Noer 1970, ch. 1). After finishing their studies most of them returned to Indonesia with more comprehensive knowledge of Islam and taught in traditional Islamic schools, correcting the erroneous thoughts and practices of Islam such as syncretism that had been widespread since the very beginning of its spread. These attempts had led to the formation of group which Geertz called santri.

 

V.                Conclusion

       In Indonesia there have been two major social classes that develop particularly from the basis of religious devoutness as defined by Geertz (1960). Santri is always associated with orthodox Muslims who are against syncretism which is believed and practiced by a class called abangan or Javanese ordinary people as opposed to Javanese aristocrats called priyayi. Santriabangan cleavage is proved to be prevalent in Indonesia’s 1955 election. At least four major parties that gain majority of votes; PNI, Masyumi, Nadhatul Ulama and PKI seek support from either santri or abangan. While Masyumi and Nadhatul Ulama are the parties of santri, PNI and PKI mainly gain votes from abangan (Feith 1957; Kahn 1978; Liddle 1970).

       Since this article only examines the voting patterns in 1955 elections, the author suggests that it will be far better if there are some researches picking other Indonesia’s elections as samples in both during the so called New Order regime under Suharto and afterward so as to find out whether santri-abangan cleavage is still relevant.

 

By Fahlesa Munabari

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