Prahara di Negeri Jiran

  “Para pemimpin kami sangat bangga dengan iklim demokrasi Malaysia, namun pada kenyataannya demokrasi kami bahkan lebih buruk daripada Burma dan Bangladesh.”

       Kritikan pedas di atas yang diungkapkan Rosli, salah seorang pegawai negeri Malaysia, menyusul demonstrasi besar-besaran yang melibatkan sekitar 30.000 orang di Kuala Lumpur belum lama ini setidaknya menjadi peringatan bagi Perdana Menteri Abdullah Badawi bahwa stabilitas yang tidak diiringi dengan perbaikan iklim demokrasi bisa menjadi bom waktu bagi negeri multi-etnis berpenduduk lebih dari 24 juta jiwa itu.

       Tuntutan agar pelaksanaan pemilu yang akan digelar awal tahun depan berlangsung dengan jujur dan adil sejatinya hanyalah salah satu isu yang dilontarkan oleh para demonstran yang sebagian besar berasal dari elemen partai oposisi dan NGO. Esensi dari demonstrasi yang dimotori mantan Deputi Perdana Menteri Anwar Ibrahim ini sebenarnya berangkat dari keinginan yang dalam untuk memoles wajah quasi-autoritarianisme Malaysia menjadi lebih demokratis.

       Di awal perjalanannya Malaysia banyak dipuji sebagai contoh negara Dunia Ketiga yang menurut ilmuwan politik Arend Lijphart sukses menerapkan consociational democracy yang salah satu cirinya mensyaratkan adanya pemerintahan koalisi strategis. Koalisi yang menjelma dalam bentuk Barisan Nasional ini terdiri dari tiga partai besar yang mewakili tiga etnis dominan di Malaysia; partai UMNO (United Malay National Organization) sebagai wadah aspirasi etnis Melayu (bumiputra), partai MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) dan partai MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) sebagai mesin politik etnis Cina dan India.

       Hanya saja, bentuk ideal pemerintahan koalisi yang mengakomodasi kelompok minoritas utama tersebut tidak dibarengi dengan komitmen kuat terhadap penerapan nilai-nilai demokrasi dan keadilan. Malaysia hampir saja jatuh ke jurang kerusuhan etnis berkepanjangan pada insiden 13 Mei 1969 yang dipicu oleh ketidakpuasan etnis Cina dan India dengan jumlah persentase penduduk masing-masing sebesar 23,7% dan 7,1% terhadap kebijakan pemerintah yang cenderung pro terhadap etnis Melayu (Affirmative Action).

       Di bawah kepemimpinan Mahathir, Malaysia sukses didapuk sebagai salah satu ‘Macan Asia’ pada awal tahun 90-an dan termasuk salah satu negara Asia yang berhasil menahan terpaan krisis ekonomi tahun 1997. Sayangnya, rekor tersebut ternoda oleh keputusan pemimpin yang mendapat julukan ‘Sukarno Kecil’ itu untuk mencopot wakilnya, Anwar Ibrahim, pada tahun 1998 dan menjebloskannya ke penjara atas tuduhan korupsi dan sodomi.

       Dengan mengakhiri karir politik Anwar, Mahathir dan UMNO sebagai partai penguasa secara tidak langsung telah menabur benih konflik politik yang pada gilirannya mengundang ketidakpuasan serta simpati ribuan demonstran untuk menentang penahanan Anwar yang meskipun ketika itu berhasil dipadamkan oleh Kepolisian Diraja Malaysia, namun sempat menuai kecaman keras dari komunitas internasional.

       Dengan kendaraan politiknya yang baru, Partai Keadilan Rakyat, tidak berlebihan kiranya jika sebagai ajang pemanasan sebelum pemilu 2008, Anwar menggalang koalisi bertajuk ‘Bersih’ yang terdiri dari berbagai elemen partai oposisi dan masyarakat sipil untuk menyuarakan reformasi sistem pemilu yang selama ini banyak dinilai kalangan diwarnai dengan korupsi dan kecurangan. Wacana inilah yang kemudian mengemuka dan mencapai klimaksnya pada gelombang demonstrasi besar belum lama ini yang dihiasi dengan teriakan yel-yel ‘Selamatkan Malaysia’.

       Tidak berbeda dengan Mahathir yang menganggap demonstrasi sebagai aktivitas ilegal, Badawi juga menanggapi aksi protes tersebut dengan tangan besi. Ia justru memuji langkah yang diambil aparat kepolisian dalam membubarkan massa, meskipun hal itu dilakukan dengan menggunakan gas air mata dan mengundang reaksi keras dari Human Rights Watch yang mendesak Badawi untuk segera membentuk komisi independen pencari fakta.

       Namun demikian, tuntutan reformasi sistem pemilu pada khususnya dan reformasi birokrasi pada umumnya tampaknya masih jauh dari harapan jika kita melihatnya dari kacamata konstelasi politik di parlemen. Barisan Nasional yang selalu unggul dalam pemilu dan menguasai mayoritas kursi di parlemen sejak tahun 1959 terlalu kuat untuk dikritisi oleh partai oposisi pimpinan Lim Kit Siang yang terdiri dari DAP (Partai Aksi Demokrasi), PAS (Partai Islam se-Malaysia) yang cukup puas dengan hanya menguasai daerah pemilihan di negara bagian Kelantan dan Terengganu, dan PKR (Partai Keadilan Rakyat).

       Di samping itu faktor lain yang bisa menjadi jawaban mengapa gelombang demonstrasi di Indonesia tahun 1998 mampu menumbangkan rezim Suharto sementara dua demonstrasi besar di Malaysia tahun 1998 dan baru-baru ini tidak sedikitpun membawa angin perubahan adalah ekonomi. Pergantian rezim di Indonesia ketika itu sangat dipengaruhi oleh tragedi ekonomi yang salah satunya disebabkan oleh melemahnya nilai tukar mata uang Rupiah terhadap Dolar Amerika Serikat. Sementara itu, Malaysia yang meskipun tidak sepenuhnya luput dari krisis tersebut, hingga sekarang mampu mempertahankan kestabilan ekonominya.

       Ke depan sejauh mana dinamika konflik antara kelompok oposisi dan masyarakat sipil yang giat mengusung isu reformasi dengan pemerintah yang menjadikan stabilitas nasional sebagai panglima mewarnai perpolitikan Malaysia akan sangat tergantung dari seberapa arif Barisan Nasional yang dipimpin UMNO untuk merespon tuntutan tersebut. Mahathir dan Badawi mungkin masih bisa sekali atau dua kali membubarkan demonstrasi dengan semprotan gas air mata. Namun, sampai kapan pendekatan tangan besi itu akan dipertahankan?

       Sejarah di banyak negara telah membuktikan bahwa upaya yang dilakukan pemerintah untuk mematikan aspirasi akar rumput yang menghendaki perubahan dengan cara-cara kekerasan bisa menjadi bom waktu yang siap meledak pada saatnya nanti.

By Fahlesa Munabari

*Artikel ini dimuat kolom Opini Koran Sindo Edisi Sore, Sabtu 24 November 2007.

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Making Sense of Transnational Islamic Revivalist Group: Hizb ut-Tahrir(1)

       I. Introduction
       It was not until the beginning of 2000s that Hizb ut-Tahrir which is literally translated as “Party of Liberation” received considerable attention in the academic realm, thanks partly to the very occurrence of 9/11 that brought about ‘War on Terrorism’ campaign pioneered by the U.S. aiming to annihilate such terrorist groups as Al-Qaeda and Taliban(2). This has inevitably brought a number of Islamist groups ranging from Palestine-based Hamas which has always been considered a rogue group to much less radical Muslim Brotherhood, not to mention Hizb ut-Tahrir closer to the target of this particular long-term war. Once arguably the least known Islamic group, Hizb ut-Tahrir is now gaining more and more popular exposure, particularly in the eyes of think thanks which are concerned with efforts to thwart perceived threat posed by radical Islamic groups. The goal of this literature review is to integrate and summarize what has been up to now known about Hizb ut-Tahrir by pointing out major agreements and disagreements on certain issues. It also attempts to indicate the direction for the author future research. This article will be divided into two major sections. While the first section will be analyzing such organizational aspects as objectives and methods, membership and financial resources, the group status as to whether violent or non-violent and the location of headquarters, the second section deals with the group’s platform which in many aspects opposes the concept of nation-state along with its byproducts.

       II. Organizational Aspects of Hizb ut-Tahrir
       2.1. Objectives and Methods
       Organizational aspects of Hizb ut-Tahrir are deemed necessary to discuss so as to provide us with preliminary understanding of the group. Hizb ut-Tahrir is ostensibly a political party established in the then Jordanian-ruled Al-Quds or Jerussalem by a Palestinian serving as a judge in the sharia court of Haifa, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani(3), in 1953(4). Al-Nabhani pulled out of Muslim Brotherhood in which he used to be active due to disagreement over organizational methods it adopted which he regarded as being too soft. In addition, he aspired to revive a transnational Islamic Caliphate (Khilafah) which once united all Muslims in the world but ended up being dissolved by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, alias Attaturk officially in October 1923 (Cohen 2003, 3; Baran 2004, xi).
       The resumption of Islamic way of life and promulgation of Islamic teachings (da’wah) serve as its general objectives(5). Although these objectives seem to share tone with other such Islamic group as Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir articulates them into a much more definite approach by placing emphasis on the restoration of the Caliphate. It is against this backdrop that the author categorizes Hizb ut-Tahrir as a revivalist group, given its bold weight to the reestablishment of the Caliphate(6).
       Albeit the goal of establishing the Caliphate is of paramount importance, its members do not leave aside an effort to carry the da’wah in order to change the situation of corrupt society whose way of life—according to them—has been contaminated heavily with such non-Islamic thought as democracy, nationalism, capitalism, secularism, nation-state and some other Western-inspired thought into an Islamic society(7). The rejection of the aforementioned mainstream notion has undoubtedly placed Hizb ut-Tahrir in an array of Islamist groups with an extreme posture not only against the West but also conventional wisdom, exposing itself to vulnerable position in the epoch of “War against Terrorism” which appears to be tantamount to “War against Extremism”(8).

Its method to convey the da’wah emulates the one practiced by the Prophet Muhammad throughout his prophethood. Accordingly, Hizb ut-Tahrir specifies its method of action into three stages as follows:(9)

1. The fist stage: the stage of culturing to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party, so that they form the Party group;
2. The second stage: the stage of interaction with the ummah, to let the ummah embrace and carry Islam, so that the ummah takes it up as its issue, and thus works to establish it in the affairs of life;
3. The third stage: the stage of establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the world.
       Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to have passed the first stage of action since the very beginning of the party establishment. It is, however, still grappling with the second stage as the ultimate objective—establishing the Caliphate—to date remains unattainable.

       2.2 Membership and Financial Resources
       Hizb ut-Tahrir’s membership is open to Muslims men and women either they are Arab or non-Arab. Its membership is also, interestingly, accessible not only to Sunni Muslims but also to Shiite as it is clearly affirmed in its organizational foundation that it invites all Muslims regardless of their nationalities, colors or schools of thought (mazhab)(10). Nevertheless, in practice, it is most likely that there is no Shiite Muslim in its membership list(11).
       The way the group operates and recruits its members resembles Marxist-Leninist party which is highly secretive, deliberately selecting cell model to circumvent persecution by authorities in most countries it is present. Its members take responsibility to flourish the cell in which one cell consists of four to five individuals who do neither necessarily know nor make contact with other cells, functioning in line with a pyramid model (Cohen 2003; Akbarzadeh 2004a; 2004b; Baran 2005; Arifin 2005). However, this clandestineness may not apply to certain places where Hizb ut-Tahrir is allowed to exist (Baran 2004, 102; Mayer, 8).            
       While it is evident that Hizb ut-Tahrir eschews being an exclusive sect-based group of Muslims, its financial resources, though solid, are anything but definite　(Karagiannis 2006a, 2006b). Nonetheless, its Indonesian branch member assured the author that the group derived largely its financial resources from member fees and non-conditional financial aid from donors(12).

       2.3. Violent or non-violent Group?
       Hizb ut-Tahrir ostensibly espouses no violence to struggle for the reestablishment of the Caliphate (Sethre 2003; Wishnick 2004; Mayer 2004; Baran 2004; Akbarzadeh 2004a, 2004b; Farrar 2006; Grodsky 2007). It is also safe from being classified as a terrorist group in U.S. Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations released on October 11, 2005(13). However, some analysts maintain that the group has potential for being a violent group, at least posing a serious threat particularly to American interests (Cohen 2003, Osman 2003, Mayer 2004).
       2.4. Location of Headquarters
       Hizb ut-Tahrir’s headquarters location is among the most contentious issues to discuss. While many posited that London, Britain serves as its base (Cohen 2003; Akbarzadeh 2004a, 2004b; Ayoob 2005; Adamson 2005; Karagiannis 2006a), Jordan is, too, claimed to be its headquarters (Ilkhamov 2001; Baran 2004; Abedin 2004a). The certainty of the group’s headquarters is, however, meaningful to determine whether the group’s branches operating in many countries maintain close-knit relationships with their main base, thereby elucidating their organizational structures and command.
       Despite disagreement over the headquarters’ location, it is most likely that Jordan is the real base of the group. It is implied that Hizb ut-Tahrir base in Jordan exerted its authority when it criticized then leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, Omar Bakri Muhammad, for deviating from the group’s strategy. Omar eventually resigned from his post in 1996 and preferred to establish a splinter group called Al-Muhajiroun (Farouki 2000, 31).      

       III. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Stance on the Concept of the Nation-State and Consequences that Follow
       One of the most striking features of Hizb ut-Tahrir is its rejection of the concept of the nation-state as acknowledged by most analysts concerned with the group (e.g. Wee 2002; Baran 2005; Farrar 2006). In an era where the nation-state has been a universal model of political entity which is taken for granted, this posture is so unusual that the group is most likely the only one of its kinds that espouses the establishment of the Caliphate which, by nature, renders the nation-state meaningless. In this section, I will be delineating the differences between the concept of the nation-state and the Caliphate, employing the theory of nation proposed by Benedict Anderson (1991) and Anthony Smith (1986) as a basic tool to explain why the nation-state is a relatively new phenomenon and distinct from other previous political entities that ever existed such as kingdom or the Caliphate itself.
       There are at least four clear-cut features which are embedded in the model of the nation-state and consequently distinguish itself from the Caliphate. The first is the element of a finite geographical boundary the nation-state possesses. It is not unusual that all nation-states on the earth have their own finite imaginary line upon which they establish their moral and political claims, as Anderson (Ibid., 6) put it:
       The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.
       While a finite boundary is the sine qua none for the nation-state, the Caliphate requires no such a boundary as it is—antithetical to the nation-state—an infinite boundary which can either enlarge due to annexation or shrink due to, for instance, land concessions as a result of losing a war(14).
       The source of law serves as the second feature of the nation-state. While the Caliphate derives its law and order from divine scripts, the nation-state is born out of French Revolution in which the role of both religion and religious institutions are radically diminished, inescapably being relegated to a mere individual sphere(15).
       It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith’s ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state (Anderson Ibid.).
       Based on the article 7 of a proposed constitution formulated by Al-Nabhani (2002, 116-117), the Islamic law is implemented on all citizens who hold citizenship of the Caliphate. It is applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims in such matters as transactions, punishments and evidences (at court) as well as the system of ruling and economics. However, non-Muslims are guaranteed freedom to practice their own beliefs.
       One may argue that in fact there are some nation-states being considered applying Islamic law (sharia) such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, not to mention Indonesia, but from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s perspective they are far from being the real Islamic states nonetheless. Some of the reasons are attributable to the fact that they do not implement the sharia in toto as set out by the group and meet no requirements for being comparable to the Caliphate, for they keep adhering to the
concept of the nation-state. As for Iran, despite contentions that it represents a successful model of political Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir condemns its retention of sectarian principles, yet Iran embraces the system of Republic which is, too, alien to Islam (Abedin 2004b, 10-11).
       The third element is the notion of nationalism which disagrees with the very basic bond of society in the Caliphate. Nationalism is considered a notion being inseparable from the concept of nation-state, serving itself as the most fundamental bond upon which relations between people and their nation-state are molded. Thus, nationalism is defined as a sense of loyalty or belonging to the nation-state which is of paramount importance and invariably in existence in so far as the nation-state model remains unaltered (Smith 1986; 2004).
       In truth, it is only in the era of the nation-state where such vital ingredients as shared history of the past, myths, legend and the likes are reinvented and subsequently invoked through mass education and the media, irrevocably boosting people’s sense of deep attachments to their nation-state. These attachments as a consequence become the basic bond of all people or ‘citizens’ in an apter term living in an imagined community called the nation-state.
       …It is one that involves ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and reconstructions; each generation must re-fashion national institutions and stratification systems in the light of the myths, memories, values and symbols of the ‘past’, which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups and institutions (Smith 1986, 206).
       In contrast with the nation-state upon which nationalism as its derivative tenet is anchored, the Caliphate utilizes no ingredients but Islam to engender the true sense of unity and belonging, consequently rendering nationality-based attachments worthless. Al-Nabhani (Ibid., 34) castigated nationalism for being badly chosen to serve as a bond in three following reasons:
1. It is a tribal bond which is inappropriate to bind man with man in his quest for revival;
2. It is an emotional bond that arises from the survival instinct, thus resulting in the love for dominance;
3. It is an inhuman bond for it causes conflicts among people over dominion.
After rejecting nationalism, Al-Nabhani claimed the Islamic creed (‘aqeedah) to be the only correct bond which binds mankind in life, yet it is unequivocally stated in article 1 of the proposed constitution of the Caliphate (Ibid., 115).
       The fourth and the last element in dispute is the source of sovereignty and authority applied in the nation-state and the Caliphate. This dispute also explains why Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects participation in general election in all countries where it operates, despite its outspoken claim of being a political party (Okar 2001; Mandaville 2007; Ronen 2002; Cohen 2003; Mayer 2004; Turmudi and Sihbudi 2004; Karagiannis 2006b). Adhering to this posture, Hizb ut-Tahrir consciously opts to become an outsider in a modern political system in which general election is believed to have been the most universally accepted method for putting democracy system into operation.
       It is evident that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s disagreement over the source of sovereignty and authority in the nation-state model provides the raison d’être of its rejection of the so called modern political system so as not to participate in general election. Al-Nabhani (Ibid., 46 ) argued that the nation-state does not recognize the distinction between the source of sovereignty and authority, whereas the Caliphate does. As opposed to the nation-state which derives the source of both sovereignty and authority from the people, Al-Nabhani suggested that in the Caliphate sovereignty belongs to the divine law (sharia) not to the state or the people, while the authority belongs to the people (ummah) and it is manifested in the state.
       It is actually not the election process per se which is condemned by the group. Indeed, in regard to the method of election or voting Hizb ut-Tahrir does not rule out this particular method for electing the leader of the Caliphate which is called the Caliph (Khalifah). The Caliphate also has a body akin to the People Assembly namely Majlis al-Ummah having the authority to either appoint the Caliph through exclusive deliberation among its members or to propose the name of the candidates to the ummah to be voted for(16).
       The group objects to participate in general election because of the model of the nation-state itself which is opposed to the Caliphate. Since the nation-state is considered not Islamic, its byproducts such as constitution, law, state principles and so on are consequently not Islamic. Had Hizb ut-Tahrir participated in general election and become involved as a player in a parliament, it would have unavoidably had to comply with all the nation-state byproducts which run no parallel with its very platform. Despite its rejection of general election, Hizb ut-Tahrir ran candidates as independents in Jordanian elections for the Chamber of Deputies in 1954 and 1956; in both elections it won only one seat. The party was actually illegal as the Jordanian government never granted it legal recognition, but it registered as an association under the Ottoman Law of Associations still which was at the time still effective nonetheless (Commins 1991; Okar 2001; Moaddel 2002).
       It appears that its decision to participate in both elections not long after the party establishment is attributable to its early attempts to ascertain the most suitable method for effectively achieving its goals. Learning from the past useless experience in elections, coupled with ubiquitous Arab governments’ heavy-handed measures against its members, it significantly changed its posture and came up with a seemingly fixed ground rules of political actions; being an extra-parliamentarian movement. In Jordanian political arena Hizb ut-Tahrir’s extra-parliamentarian posture was conspicuous when it boycotted 1989 election, the first election to take place after the abolition of political parties by the government in 1957, due to the fact that it saw no benefit in participation and refused to recognize the constitution (Okar Ibid., 558).
       In striking contrast to its universal propensity for being an extra-parliamentarian movement, in a group’s international conference held in Jakarta, August 12, 2007, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia’s spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, did not rule out his party’s participation in a future Indonesian general election on the grounds that as an international party it had experience in doing so in Jordan and Lebanon(17). This deviation is nevertheless worth confirming and examining so as to determine the group’s actual posture of participation in general election.   

       IV. Conclusion
       Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to be a political party aiming to restore the Caliphate which has been absent since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 (Cohen 2003, 3; Baran 2004, xi). The way the group operates is akin to Marxist-Leninist party which is clandestine, functioning in accordance with a pyramid model in which members belong to a certain cell neither do necessarily recognize nor make contact with other members in different cells (Cohen 2003; Akbarzadeh 2004a; 2004b; Baran 2005; Arifin 2005). However, such clandestineness may not apply to certain countries where the group is given permission to operate (Baran 2004, 102; Mayer, 8). Many agreed that the group’s source of financial resources is, if any but definite (Karagiannis 2006a, 2006b). While some argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s location of headquarters is in London, Britain (Cohen 2003; Akbarzadeh 2004a, 2004b; Ayoob 2005; Adamson 2005; Karagiannis 2006a), others believed that Jordan serves as its base (Farouki 2000; Ilkhamov 2001; Baran 2004; Abedin 2004a).
        In terms of ideological stance, Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects the concept of the nation-state (e.g. Wee 2002; Baran 2005; Farrar 2006). The differences between the nation-state and the Caliphate were examined, employing the theory of the nation-state suggested by Anderson (1991) and Smih (1986). These differences lie in the spheres of boundary, source of law, basic bond of society and source of sovereignty as well as authority. The nation-state possesses a finite boundary, while the Caliphate possesses an infinite one. A secular law is adopted by most nation-states in the world, whereas the Caliphate adopts a divine law. In contrast to the Caliphate which treats Islam as a creed as its basic bond of society, the nation-state produces nationalism as its basic bond. Lastly, despite affinity between the source of authority in the nation-state and the Caliphate; the people (ummah), both political entities differ over the source of sovereignty; the former derives it from the people, while the latter from the divine law (sharia). One of the most remarkable consequences of these differences is the group rejection of participation in general election, positioning itself as an extra-parliamentarian movement (Okar 2001; Mandaville 2007; Ronen 2002; Cohen 2003; Mayer 2004; Turmudi and Sihbudi 2004; Karagiannis 2006b).
       The future research on the group is deemed essential to ascertain how consistent Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia branch is with the group’s international platform in its efforts to implement its objectives within Indonesian context, given that Islamail Yusanto, the spokesperson of Indonesian branch, came up with the idea of possible participation in general election in the country. Preliminary assumption that can be proposed for the future research is that there are possibly some aspects of anomalies which deviate the dynamics of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia branch from the supposedly grand platform of the group.
 

Endnotes

(1) Authored by Fahlesa Munabari, a graduate student of Peace & Conflict Studies Department, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
(2) There are several literatures that either exclusively or partly touch upon Hizb ut-Tahrir prior to the year 2000 such as those by Commins 1991; Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988; Midlarsky 1998. However, we can search easily an abundance of them from the year 2000 onward (e.g. Cohen 2003; Mayer 2004; Akbarzadeh 2004a; 2004b; Baran 2004, Karagiannis 2006a; 2006b; Mandaville 2007).
(3) For more detailed biography of Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, see for example: Commins 1991; Arifin 2005, 89.
(4) According to Omar Bakri Muhammad, erstwhile leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, it has a former name al-Hay’at al-Tahrir al-Islami roughly translated as “Islamic Liberation Society” (Abedin 2004a, 4).
(5) Hizb ut-Tahrir Official Website. Definition. 29 Dec 2007. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def
(6) Esposito and Voll (2001, 39), too, preferred to use the term or revivalist movement to refer to such Islamist groups as Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan-based Jamaat-i-Islami. According to Esposito, Islamic revivalism is not defined as condition in which Islam had disappeared or has been absent in the Muslim world and should therefore be revived. It is, however, viewed as not only a religious but also a sociopolitical phenomenon in the world today in which Islam or more aptly called Islamic movement demands a much higher profile in both politics and society than it has been over the past few decades (Esposito 1992, 11).
(7) Hizb ut-Tahrir Official Website. Ibid.
(8) Hizb ut-Tahrir views the clash of civilization, particularly between Islam and the West as inevitable (Anon. 2002).
(9) Hizb ut-Tahrir Official Website. Ibid.
(10) Ibid.
(11) For more detailed discussion on this issue, see (Abedin 2004a).
(12) Tindiyo (spokeperson of Hizb ut-Tahrir Yogyakarta Province Branch, Indonesia). in discussion with the author, December 4, 2005.
(13) U.S. Department of State. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Jan 5, 2008. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm
(14) Tindiyo. Ibid.
For further description of how the early phase of the Caliphate expanded its boundary, see Al-Baladhuri 2002.
(15) Many believe, including Anderson, that French Revolution played a key role to bring the nation-state into existence, rendering the old model of political entity—kingdom—obsolete (e.g. Merriman 2004; Hutchinson and Smith 2004). For comprehensive historical account of French Revolution, see for example: Doyle 2003.
(16) Tindiyo. Ibid.
(17) Detik.com. HTI Bakal Jadi Parpol (Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia Will Become a Political Party). Aug 12, 2007. http://www.detikinet.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2007/bulan/08/tgl/12/time/101247/idnews/816087/idkanal/10

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